Jersey & Guernsey Law Review – February 2012
Some Thoughts on the Relationship
Between the Pauline Action and the Désastre
Regime in Jersey
Sinéad Agnew
1 Until the judgment of Birt DB (as he then
was) in In re Esteem Settlement ten years ago, the Pauline action was a little known and little
used Jersey customary law action. The Esteem
judgment clarified the nature and operation of the action in general terms
but its relationship with Jersey’s désastre regime remains unclear. The
purpose of this note is briefly to compare the extent of the protection offered
to creditors by the Pauline action and art 17 of the Bankruptcy (Désastre)
(Jersey) Law 1990 (“the Désastre Law”) and to
consider how a Pauline action is likely to be affected by the fact that the
plaintiff may not be the only creditor.
The Pauline action
and art 17 of the Désastre Law—a
brief comparison
2 The origins of the Pauline action may be
found in Roman law: its purpose is to allow a creditor to revoke an alienation
of assets by his debtor to a third party, which has been made in order to
defeat the interests of creditors. As Birt DB explained in Esteem, the Pauline action is personal,
revocatory and restitutionary in nature. The creditor may reverse a
transfer by the debtor of the debtor’s own property to a third party, as
long as the creditor can show that (a) he is a creditor of the debtor; (b) the
transfer of assets is made when the debtor is insolvent or the transfer renders
him insolvent; (c) the debtor makes the transfer with the intention of
defrauding his creditors; and (d) the transfer causes actual prejudice to the
creditor himself.
If the transfer of assets is made for value, the creditor must also demonstrate
that the recipient was “privy to the real nature of the transaction”
before the transfer will be reversed. If the elements of the
cause of action are made out, the third party recipient will be ordered to give
up the original assets or their proceeds of sale and, possibly—if the
transfer was for value and the recipient was privy to its real nature—any profits made by
the recipient from the assets after the Pauline action has been commenced. The defence of change of
position is available to an
innocent recipient who has changed his position in good faith in reliance on
the receipt.
According to Birt DB in the Esteem case,
the Pauline action is an action
personelle réelle, which attracts a prescription period of ten
years.
3 The Pauline action stands alongside the
statutory bankruptcy regime. The closest statutory equivalent is art 17 of the Désastre Law, which provides,
amongst other things, as follows—
“(1)
If a debtor has at a relevant time entered into a transaction with a person at
an undervalue the court may, on the application of the Viscount, make such an
order as the court thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would have
been if the debtor had not entered into the transaction.
“(2) The court shall not make an order under
paragraph (1) if it is satisfied—
(a) that
the debtor entered into the transaction in good faith for the purpose of
carrying on a business or, in the case of a company, its business; and
(b) that,
at the time the debtor entered into the transaction, there were reasonable
grounds for believing that the transaction would be of benefit to the debtor.”
4 Article
17 has several features. For its purposes, good faith turns on whether the
recipient was aware that the transfer was at an undervalue, was made at a time
when the debtor was insolvent or would likely lead to his insolvency and
whether the recipient was an associate of or connected to the debtor.
A transaction at an undervalue means a gift or a transaction by way of a
marriage settlement or on terms for which there is no cause or where the
value of the cause provided is significantly less
than that provided by the debtor, cause having its usual meaning in
Jersey customary law.
The statutory mechanism applies to transactions at an undervalue made within a
period of five years immediately preceding the making of a declaration that the
debtor was en désastre,
provided that the debtor became insolvent before or as a result of the
transaction itself.
There is no limiting period in cases where the transaction is made with a
person connected with a debtor or with an associate of the debtor.
Finally, a bona fide purchaser for value is not required to give up any
benefit from the transaction unless he was a party to the transaction and the
property interests of more remote recipients are protected.
5 In
two respects the Pauline action offers more extensive protection to creditors
than that available under art 17. First, the ability of a creditor to reverse a
transaction under art 17 is limited to transactions occurring in the five years
before the debtor’s désastre,
whereas the prescription period for the Pauline action is a more generous ten
year period. Secondly, if a creditor can raise a Pauline action, he is not
limited to reversing transactions at an under-value; as long as he can
demonstrate that the recipient knew what the debtor was up to, he may also
reverse transactions at full value. It is right to point out, however, that it
may be more difficult to get a Pauline action claim off the ground because the
creditor must show that the debtor entered into the transaction with the
intention to prejudice his creditors, whereas art 17 is neutral as to the
debtor’s intention. That said, the test for intention established in Esteem is fairly creditor-friendly. A
creditor must show that the debtor was dishonest, but the fact that the defeat
of creditors is the natural result of a transaction is a material factor in
assessing whether the necessary state of mind is established and the creditor
need only show that the intention to defeat creditors was a substantial purpose
of the debtor—it need not have been his only or dominant purpose.
In Esteem itself the court found that
Sheikh Fahad (the debtor) had the capacity to arrange his affairs to defraud
his creditors, failed to attend the hearing of the Pauline action and gave no
explanation for the transfers of assets to Abacus (the third party recipient). These
factors, together with its (not altogether favourable) view of Sheikh
Fahad’s character, caused it to infer the requisite
intention to defraud on his part. This shows that the court will not always
require the creditor to identify an explicit, fully articulated intention to
defraud on the part of the debtor. Intention may be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the transaction and in practical terms the evidential
burden may not be too difficult to surmount, thus making the Pauline action a
useful and potentially more potent alternative to an art 17 application.
A coterie of creditors
6 There
is a paucity of authority as to when, if ever, a Pauline action plaintiff must
share the spoils of a successful Pauline action with other creditors. The Esteem judgment is silent on this
question and in the Golder case,
the only other significant Pauline action judgment given in the last fifty
years in Jersey, the Pauline action plaintiff
was the only creditor. Either GT was Sheikh Fahad’s only creditor in Esteem or none of his other creditors
was aware of or wished to be involved in the Pauline action. In any case, if
there are no other creditors there is no reason why the Pauline action
plaintiff should not keep the spoils of his successful claim to himself.
7 If
other creditors do exist, the impact of their existence on the conduct and
outcome of the Pauline action depends on whether désastre
proceedings are commenced by them or the debtor himself and if so, when. Three
potential scenarios arise in which art 10(1) of the Désastre Law
may play a role. Article 10(1) provides as follows—
“(1)
With effect from the date of the declaration a creditor to whom the debtor is
indebted in respect of a debt provable in the ‘désastre’ shall not—
(a) have
any other remedy against the property or person of the debtor in respect of the
debt;
(b) commence
any action or legal proceedings to recover the debt; or
(c) except
with the consent of the Viscount or by order of the court, continue any action
or legal proceedings to recover the debt.”
8 If
the debtor himself or another creditor were to start désastre
proceedings and obtain a declaration of désastre before the
commencement of the Pauline action, the effect of art 10(1) would be that the désastre procedure would take
precedence and the Pauline action plaintiff could not commence his action at
all. He could only invite the Viscount to commence the
action on his behalf and, perhaps, that of other creditors too.
9 Alternatively,
if désastre proceedings were commenced after the Pauline action were commenced and a declaration of désastre
were granted before judgment was delivered, as a result of art 10(1) the
plaintiff would require the Viscount’s consent for the continuance of the
Pauline action. The Viscount might well allow the Pauline action to continue
unless he thought that art 17 provided a better route to recovery of the
debtor’s assets. If he thought that the Pauline action was to be
preferred and was aware of other creditors who were or might have been
prejudiced by the transfer of the debtor’s assets to the recipient he
would probably seek to be joined to the action on their behalf or, indeed, be
substituted as plaintiff on behalf of all prejudiced creditors. Finally, if désastre
proceedings were commenced after the Pauline action had been started but no
declaration had been made before the conclusion of the Pauline action, the
plaintiff would not need the Viscount’s consent for the continuance of
the action. However, the Viscount might again intervene in the Pauline action
and ask the court to stay the proceedings pending the grant of a declaration in
the désastre proceedings. Again, if a declaration were granted
and the Viscount thought it appropriate, he could seek to take on the mantle of
plaintiff in the Pauline action on behalf of all prejudiced creditors. In
either case, the Pauline action plaintiff could well end up having to share the
fruits of the action with other creditors and it is likely that appropriate
costs orders would be made to reflect the changes to the conduct of the action.
10 In
light of the above, it may be said that the Pauline action represents a
potentially more powerful weapon in creditors’ hands than art 17 of the Désastre
Law, as long as the hurdle of establishing the requisite intention can be
cleared. However, its utility against a debtor who has multiple creditors may
be of limited value if those other creditors seek to stymie the action by
commencing désastre proceedings in a strategic fashion. Further
clarification from the Royal Court
on the relationship between the customary law action and the statutory
procedure would be welcome.
Sinéad Agnew, LLB (Dub), MJuris (Oxon),
MPhil (Cantab), of Gray’s Inn, Barrister, is a PhD candidate in law at
the London School of Economics.