Jersey & Guernsey
Law Review – February 2013
JERSEY AND THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW DIMENSIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Stefano Mariani
This article focuses on the public international
law dimensions of a sovereign Jersey and considers the extent to which its
relationship with the international community—including the UK and the
EU—is likely to change as a result. The legal arguments for Jersey’s
sovereignty are set out, together with an analysis of the experience of
recently decolonised states in managing relations with the metropole and
whether treaty-based systems governing post-independence relations provide
useful guidance for the relationship between an independent Jersey and the UK. Finally,
the question of how independence would affect treaties relating to Jersey is
considered, including a discussion of how Jersey
could redefine its relationship with the EU. It is concluded that the institutional
foundations for Jersey’s sovereignty are already in place and that
current practice suggests that there are no public international law obstacles
to Jersey acceding to statehood, should its people will it.
Introduction
1 In the wake of the conference hosted by
this journal in September 2010 to consider options for the constitutional
future of Jersey, and the more recent comments by Sir Philip Bailhache
suggesting that Jersey “should be ready for independence”, the debate on the legality
and feasibility of sovereignty for Jersey has
gathered momentum. Jersey’s lack of formal sovereignty has deprived it of
a voice exclusively representing its own interests in international affairs,
leaving it to the UK to adopt, especially in the multilateral ambit of the
European Union (“EU”) and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), policy positions at times
inconsistent with Jersey’s customary and constitutional autonomy and
incompatible with its interests. In this respect, formal
sovereignty for Jersey would functionally improve its bargaining position with
third party states and international institutions, whilst restricting the scope
of its diplomatic reliance on the UK. Much has been written on
the topic of the implications of Jersey’s formal independence, with
particular attention devoted to how a sovereign Jersey’s constitutional
order and relationship with both the UK
and the other Channel Islands would require
re-evaluation. The question of how Jersey would stand, either alone or in a
confederation with Guernsey, Alderney and Sark, in the broader context of the
global community and public international law has, however, yet to be discussed
in depth. In particular, in plotting a hypothetical path to sovereignty, it is
crucial to bear in mind that an independent Jersey would have implications not
only for the internal constitutional order of Jersey and the UK as the
entities directly concerned, but impact on the broader European and
international community. How Jersey will adapt to external, as well as
internal, challenges arising from formal sovereignty will characterise its
relations with the UK
and the European Union and, accordingly, determine the extent to which the
objectives of fiscal and regulatory autonomy can be achieved, whilst preserving
the most beneficial aspects of its current relationships both with the
metropole and international institutions. The focus of this article will
therefore be on the public international law dimension of a sovereign Jersey,
with a view to identifying the normative basis in international law by which
Jersey could seek formal independence and contemporary alternatives to strict,
Westphalian
sovereignty that would enable the newly independent entity to address
potentially costly and untested issues of defence and external relations.
The legal basis for Jersey’s independence
2 As a matter of international customary and
treaty law, there are strong normative grounds for Jersey’s
capacity to seek independence. These principles can broadly be defined under
the umbrella terms of “national self-determination” and
“decolonisation” and are most prominently set out in art 73 of the
Charter of the United Nations (“UN”), which contains the
Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. This approach, aimed at
acknowledging the substantive right of the peoples of non-self-governing
territories (“NSGTs”) to choose the manner in which they are
governed, thus promoting progress towards self-determination, has subsequently
been reflected in landmark statements, notably UN General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV) and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States.
Whereas the UN’s efforts in this regard were centred on dismantling the
post-World War II remnants of colonial empires formed by European powers in the
18th and 19th centuries, this does not preclude the
application of now-crystallised norms of public international law favouring
self-determination for the peoples of NSGTs to the specific case of Jersey.
Indeed, Jersey meets all the criteria for
classification as a NSGT, notwithstanding that it is not currently included in
the UN’s official list of such territories. It is a settled point that
Jersey has historically been ethnically and linguistically distinct from the UK. Taking the
long-term view, its native people are largely of Franco-Norman origins, as
opposed to Anglo-Saxon descent, and French has been the language of law and
government since Jersey began its existence as
a distinct dependency of the English crown in the early 13th century. It is
only relatively recently that mass immigration has tipped the linguistic
balance. Jersey’s law, customs and mode
of government have received significant English influence, but remain
fundamentally rooted in Norman customary law. Similarly, it would be
difficult to argue that the people of Jersey are an
extension of the French nation, as Jersey has not been under the continuous
control of any authority based in mainland France for eight centuries and is
now separate, by language, custom and religion, from contemporary Normandy, not
having shared in the historical experiences, such as the French Revolution and
the establishment of the Republic, which have come to define important elements
of the French national identity. From a comparative historical perspective, it
would therefore be uncontroversial to consider the inhabitants of Jersey a “people” in the sense of a distinct
nation, or incipient nation. In this sense, Jersey is no more
“English”, than San Marino
is “Italian” or Monaco
is “French”.
3 A cursory glance at the lengthy history of
legal tensions and constitutional negotiation between the Bailiwick and
centripetal pressure from the English, and subsequently British, state evidences a sustained,
longstanding pattern of self-identification with Jersey’s
distinct cultural and legal structures and thus a widespread sentiment of
separateness from the metropole. The relationship between the people of Jersey
and the UK
has accordingly been determined, over time, by a consensus based on customary
practices, reflecting a constitutional balance of power and summarised,
however, imperfectly, in the Kilbrandon Report. In light of the normative
repudiation of the principle of colonialism, conceived as the forcible
extension of a state’s power over other territories or peoples by virtue
of superior economic or military power, Jersey’s
current status as Crown Dependency should be understood as a consensual
arrangement. Those dependencies of the UK
which are on the UN’s list of NSGT, such as the British Virgin Islands
and the Cayman Islands, remain, as noted by Le
Rendu, non-self-governing largely by virtue of the fact that there is no great
popular sentiment in favour of independence. However, if public
opinion in Jersey were to turn in favour of formal sovereignty, the UK government
might encounter significant diplomatic and legal difficulties in resisting this
pressure. To the extent that dependence from London
is unwelcome in Jersey, the non-consensual character of the denial of Jersey’s sovereignty would constitute precisely the
“alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”
that the UN has defined as “colonialism”, which is, in turn, now
proscribed by international customary law, as interpreted by the UN. Crucially,
the inhabitants of Jersey are not a minority group within the UK, whose
grievances could be addressed by greater political integration. Rather, Jersey
is a separate territory and jurisdiction, lacking formal sovereignty, which,
whilst enjoying considerable internal autonomy, does not send elected officials
to Westminster
and therefore has limited legislative influence in foreign policy and, by
extension, international commercial policy.
4 Indeed, it is not difficult to envisage UK policy on fiscal and commercial matters which
affect Jersey being drafted and enacted at the instance of partisan political
groups which are, in some cases, actively hostile to Jersey’s
interests. In the absence of internationally recognised sovereignty, there
would be little which the government of Jersey could do in this scenario to
prevent the erosion of its position, not least because any constitutional
safeguards, whether customary or written, could, as a matter of internal
policy, be overridden or modified by UK domestic law. Negotiations
undertaken by the UK on behalf of Jersey, albeit in consultation with the
government of Jersey, with the EU and the OECD in relation to information
exchange and transparency in fiscal matters have produced sub-optimal outcomes
for Jersey in part as a result of Jersey’s lack of formal sovereignty,
and thus its inability to negotiate bilaterally with either organisation as
from the position of a third party state. The question of whether
Jersey can represent its interests in the international arena as an equal
partner of third party states and international organisations in the absence of
the UK’s
assent is fundamentally a question of sovereignty. Jersey
currently does possess a limited international personality, but it is evidently
not a “state” as a matter of public international law and its
diplomatic space is limited by this fact. Conversely, once
recognised, the sovereignty of an independent state is inviolable, to the
extent that external intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state
is prima facie in contravention of
international law.
5 Though not officially recognised as a NSGT by the
UN’s Special Committee on Decolonization, Jersey
is, by any historical, sociological and institutional measure,
a paradigmatic case of a dependent territory within the meaning of art 73 of
the UN Charter. That UK
sovereignty has thus far generally been benign and built on bilateral
constitutional compromise does not undermine the validity of a latent claim Jersey
would have, as a NSGT, to independence from the UK. Jersey
has been a Crown Dependency for longer than the historical existence of any
NSGT inscribed into the UN list. In international law, the question of whether
the people of Jersey are content to acquiesce in the status quo or seek independence is a matter for them, rather than
the UK
to decide.
6 This approach, favouring a voluntary basis
for the continuation of dependency status, has implicitly been accepted by Westminster in relation to two referendums called by the government
of Gibraltar, which put to its inhabitants the
question of that overseas dependency’s constitutional status. The key difference when
compared with the prospect of a move in Jersey towards independence is that the
Gibraltarian government was, with reference to each referendum, essentially
assured of a favourable outcome in that they were seeking to maintain a
dependent relationship with the UK. However, even overwhelming popular support
in Jersey for independence could run into institutional resistance in the UK. It is
likewise probable that third party states would, in the interests of
maintaining good diplomatic relations with London,
be slow to recognise Jersey’s independence until the UK itself gave
official recognition. An inflexible stance in
the face of calls for independence would nevertheless be difficult for any UK government to maintain, especially in light
of the UK’s
sustained political and diplomatic support for movements of national
self-determination elsewhere in the world. For the same reason, the
annexation of Jersey to the UK
as a new county or constituent country is unlikely to be a
viable option in the absence of the express consent of the people of Jersey.
Managing separation from the UK
7 In abstract, Jersey
comfortably meets the four criteria for sovereign statehood as set out in art 1
of the Montevideo Convention: it has a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and the (albeit latent) capacity
to enter into relations with other states. More so than most recently
independent states, Jersey would be able to
draw upon a long and distinguished history of effective and representative
self-government and relatively mature and sophisticated regulatory and judicial
institutions. The sovereignty of economically fragile states in the Caribbean
and the Pacific that are smaller than Jersey
both in terms of land area and population is not in dispute. It is safe to
assume that to the extent that a “critical mass” is required for
statehood, Jersey, whether alone or together with the other Channel
Islands, comfortably meets this threshold. In practice, though, when
it comes to the costs arising by virtue of assuming the trappings of
sovereignty, such as an independent foreign and defence policy, size certainly
does matter. The projected financial outlays for the institution of a foreign
service and a modest defence force may even threaten Jersey’s
existence as a low-tax jurisdiction by significantly increasing government
budget requirements.
8 In addressing the issue of the costs of
independence, the question of defence can be solved relatively easily.
Notwithstanding a history occasionally punctuated by invasion from overseas, Jersey
currently faces no material risk of foreign aggression and is highly unlikely
to do so in any foreseeable timeframe. It could therefore dispense with armed
forces entirely, relying instead on its current police force for the
maintenance of internal order. This is by no means unusual. Costa Rica, for example, is constitutionally
barred from having a standing army, instead relying on the regional hegemony of
the United States and the force of customary international law in Latin America as the guarantors of its independence.
Jersey benefits from one of the safest possible geographic locations for a
newly independent state and the prospect that the UK and France, as permanent
members of the UN Security Council with a vested interest in the preservation
of the existing international legal order, would fail to act as guarantors,
whether formally or informally, of Jersey’s security thus verges on the
fanciful.
Accordingly, the most effective solution to the national self-defence question
is likely to be a bilateral agreement making the UK
responsible for Jersey’s external security in a manner essentially
analogous to arrangements currently in place between France
and the Principality of Monaco, and Italy
and San Marino.
9 From the perspective of treaty law, Jersey’s interests may be better served by relying
on bilateral security guarantees, rather than joining a multilateral military
alliance such as NATO. In particular, art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)
compels each member of the Alliance to treat an
attack on the territory of any other member of the Alliance as an attack against itself. This
automatic collective defence mechanism could draw Jersey
into confrontations over geo-strategic issues which do not, fundamentally,
concern it and which might, in fact, be detrimental to its financial interests.
A position of official neutrality, perhaps guaranteed by treaty with the UK, may better suit Jersey’s diplomatic
priorities and mirror the generally successful efforts of other major financial
centres such as Switzerland
and Liechtenstein.
10 The question of how an independent Jersey would conduct its foreign policy is more
complicated. Perhaps the greatest benefit Jersey would stand to gain from
transitioning to sovereign status is the capacity to conduct its own,
independent foreign policy in a manner which fully reflects the Island’s best interests. It would, accordingly,
appear counter-intuitive to settle for anything less than a fully-formed,
professional body of foreign relations specialists, which would, however,
likely incur significant new costs on the Bailiwick’s budget. Part of the
solution to this problem lies in the fact that Jersey
already has considerable expertise in conducting international negotiations on
specific matters. For example, the UK
entrusted Jersey to represent itself in the
context of the OECD Harmful Tax Practices initiative. As a major international
financial centre, Jersey could draw from a
considerably wider talent pool of legal and financial experts than could other states of comparable size. In light of the close
institutional links between the government of Jersey and the principal
Jersey-based financial institutions and law firms, an arrangement whereby
employees of affiliated private sector organisations would serve Jersey’s
interests abroad on a secondment basis could be instituted, thereby limiting
costs by ensuring that the bulk of foreign service personnel are recruited for ad hoc rather than permanent
assignments. This approach to staffing a foreign service may be unorthodox but,
bearing in mind that a sovereign Jersey’s diplomatic priorities are
likely to be highly specialist and focused in the financial and regulatory
sectors, rather than more broadly tied to the traditional fields of
“high” diplomacy, it would appear to be resource efficient to call
upon individuals who already have such expertise by virtue of their experience
in the private sector.
11 The need for permanent diplomatic missions would
in any event be relatively modest: at a minimum, an Embassy
or High Commission (assuming, as Kelleher does, that Jersey would as a matter
of course join the Commonwealth) in London, Brussels (to
take charge of institutional relations with the EU), and New York (on the
strong assumption that an independent Jersey would seek to join the UN). As
noted further below, the closer the diplomatic relationship of Jersey with the
UK after independence, the likelier it is that the costs of diplomatic
functions which could be managed more effectively by UK missions overseas being
inefficiently duplicated by an under-resourced Jersey foreign office would be
avoided.
12 There is nonetheless a balance to be struck
between the need for an independent Jersey to
articulate its own foreign policy and the potential benefits of remaining
associated with the extensive expertise and global coverage of the UK Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (“FCO”). If Jersey
were to become independent, it would from time to time need to address foreign
policy matters, such as consular relations or transnational security, with
which its government has no substantial prior expertise and which it would not,
in any event, have the resources to manage effectively. In this regard, the
assistance and, possibly, tutelage of the UK’s
foreign policy establishment may play an important role in
defending Jersey’s interests. A
constitutional and diplomatic model of “free association” could
therefore be considered as an alternative to full sovereignty in the classic,
Westphalian sense. Arrangements of this nature are currently in place between
the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau and between New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue. Free association may be
established by treaty or quasi-treaty, termed Compacts of Free Association by
the United States and its
associated states, or separately constituted and referenced in the domestic
legislation of the states concerned, as is the case between New Zealand and
its associates. Although the exact terms of each relationship may vary, a state
in free association with its former administrator will generally proclaim
itself, and be recognised as, a fully sovereign state, but delegate certain
functions relating to defence and foreign relations to its patron. With
reference to the United States’ Compact of Free Association with the
Marshall Islands, for example, the United States assumes full authority and
responsibility for the defence of the islands, but at the same time
recognises that the Marshall Islands are to have control over the full spectrum
of their foreign affairs, subject to a requirement
that the United States government be consulted and with the added
proviso that the United States may be called upon to assist or act on behalf of
the Marshall Islands in the area of foreign affairs as may be requested and
mutually agreed from time to time. Such a consultation and assistance mechanism enables states in free association to
access internationally recognised sovereignty (the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia are both members of the United Nations), but,
when necessary, also to draw upon the surer guidance of the former metropole in
the areas of defence and foreign affairs.
13 Applying a similar system to Jersey, mutatis
mutandis to take into account the Bailiwick’s greater degree of
institutional sophistication and historical autonomy, could thus provide
concrete solutions to the issues of cost and lack of foreign policy expertise
in the transition to independence. It would, likewise, not prevent Jersey from joining international organisations that
require sovereignty for participation, or from entering into treaties with
other states as an equal counterparty.
14 Ultimately, the choice of Jersey’s international status need not be reduced
to a dichotomy with continued existence as a Crown Dependency at one pole and
full independence at the other. The adoption of formal sovereignty within the
ambit of a legally binding and constitutionally enshrined special relationship
with the United Kingdom
would provide Jersey with most of the
advantages of sovereignty and a freer hand in its negotiations with third party
states and international organisations, whilst minimising the costs. A
compromise of this nature would have the added benefit of being more palatable
to the UK
than full independence. Whereas, on the one hand, the UK would continue to bear the costs of defending
the Island and providing, for example, consular assistance to Jersey
citizens abroad, it would retain a degree of international prestige and
diplomatic leverage by formally acting as the protecting power. Ideally, a
compromise based on free association would be mutually beneficial, serving as a
face-saving measure for the UK,
which should not, in practice, see its strategic or diplomatic position eroded,
and a diplomatic buttress for Jersey, which,
whilst gaining formal sovereignty, would preserve its close institutional and
cultural links with the metropole.
Issues of state succession
15 As the Bailiwick of Jersey is already constituted
as a distinct administrative unit, with its own borders which are both internal
– that is, the delimitation between the Bailiwick and the United Kingdom proper – and external
– the current international frontier between the Island and France – the agreed territorial scope of
an independent Jersey should be
uncontroversial. The doctrine of uti
possidetis juris would apply to provide that where a newly independent
country becomes sovereign, its borders should, as a general rule, correspond with
the frontiers of the pre-independence administrative unit comprised by that
country. This approach has applied as a matter of custom in international law
since the declaration of independence of Latin American states from Spain in
the early 19th century and is recognised as best practice for a state’s
transition to independence by the International Court of Justice.
16 Similarly, treaties which are localisable
and thereby have a defined, territorial scope with an effect on a newly
independent Jersey would likewise be inherited from the UK, together with all their
attendant duties and obligations, unless each party
concerned decides otherwise. As for non-localisable treaties and, in
particular, those of a fundamentally political character, international
customary law and practice suggests that the tabula rasa approach is to be taken. On this basis, an independent
Jersey would begin its life as a sovereign state unbound by the UK’s
current treaty obligations in respect of, for example, the UN, the EU or NATO.
17 The object of this provision of customary
international law is to enable the newly independent state to determine its own
geo-political alignment: it would thus be for the people of Jersey to define
the extent to which they wish to follow the UK’s approach to foreign
policy. Admission to the UN should be uncontroversial, as the impact of
membership would be nominal on the financial services industry which drives
Jersey’s economy, but renegotiation of the Island’s
relationship with the EU may present institutional difficulties. Protocol 3 of the UK’s
Treaty of Accession to the European Community would fall away, thereby
affording Jersey the opportunity to redefine on its own terms its institutional
relationship with the EU and ensure that this reflects Jersey’s
current priorities, especially in the fields of fiscal autonomy and financial
regulation.
A sudden break from the EU single market or, worse, the imposition of a
punitive regulatory regime by the EU on financial services based in Jersey, would
have profound economic implications on the Island,
potentially driving the costs of independence to unacceptable levels. A good,
and uninterrupted, working relationship with the EU would therefore be
essential for Jersey’s future. The
normative infrastructure for a smooth transition from a relationship based on
Protocol 3 to one based on a bilateral treaty between Jersey
and the EU is, however, already in place. Jersey’s economy is closely
integrated with the UK’s
and, by extension, with the EU common market, and the Island
has, since 1973, adopted a large portion of the EU’s acquis communautaire. The principal source of
uncertainty in Jersey–EU negotiations would, however, likely be the
political willingness of EU member states to enter into agreements extending
commercial or financial benefits to Jersey without first securing concessions
from the Island in the area of fiscal
information-sharing. The current membership and political climate of the EU are
after all quite different when compared with 1973. It is in this context that
Jersey would especially stand to benefit from the UK’s goodwill.
18 As noted above, if Jersey were to structure its
transition to sovereignty by way of free association with the metropole on
mutually attractive terms, it should have the option to draw upon considerable
FCO expertise in negotiating with Brussels.
More to the point, it is likely to be in the UK’s
best interests to ensure that a new set of treaties regulating Jersey’s
relationship with the EU are successful in preserving the Island’s status
as a major offshore financial centre, especially in light of the City of London’s extensive investment interests in the Channel
Islands. A modest diplomatic weight has not, however, prevented
states such as San Marino
from negotiating a treaty-based relationship with the EU, providing, for
example, the benefits of the common market, whilst stopping short of full
membership.
Further, Jersey’s history of juridical
and internal autonomy suggests that the practical
difficulties normally encountered by newly independent states attaining
independence from centralised regimes would be kept to a minimum. For example,
there would be no need to distribute the national debt, state archives or other
forms of state property and obligations between the UK
and Jersey. Similarly, the question of the
citizenship of the people of Jersey could be
addressed by official recognition of the status
quo. Channel Islanders are currently British citizens and this relationship
may be maintained by mutual agreement, in recognition of the indissoluble
social links between Jersey and the metropole.
An accommodation on this basis is currently in place between New Zealand and the associated state of Niue, and would moreover fully
resolve the issue of securing consular protection for inhabitants of Jersey abroad. This would not, however, necessarily
preclude the introduction of a separate Jersey citizenship, which could, for
example, be a precondition for voting in national elections in the Island.
Conclusions
19 The most important questions in the
debate on Jersey’s constitutional future are essentially questions of
fact, which turn on the political willingness of the people of Jersey radically
to change the Island’s relationship with the UK and, likewise, on the
political willingness in Westminster to provide Jersey with an adequate
diplomatic and constitutional space in which it can best represent its
interests. These questions have yet to be answered and would, in any event, be
beyond the scope of this discussion. Rather, those responsible for posing and
answering the question of whether Jersey’s future lies with the
acquisition of formal sovereignty should consider that the normative and legal
bases for Jersey’s independence are
fully in place. Sovereignty could be achieved with relatively little difficulty
on the basis of public international customary and treaty law, as currently
practised and interpreted both by the UK and by the UN. Jersey’s
legal claim to sovereignty is as
strong as that of any newly independent state in the post-1945 period.
20 Sovereignty does not, however, necessarily mean
“going it alone”. Free association offers an attractive model for
Jersey and would enable it to represent its interests in certain domains of
international relations, whilst relying on the UK in others where the cost of
discharging its sovereign duties autonomously would far exceed any gains
arising from independence. Symbolically, free association would also affirm the
profound historical ties between Jersey and the UK, which would, unambiguously, be the senior
partner in the relationship, thereby limiting the risk of bilateral tension in
a process which, if not handled sensitively, could be perceived in Westminster as an affront
to national dignity. Finally, whether sovereignty can be followed by
“business as usual” for Jersey
will depend on its ability successfully to re-negotiate its relationship with
the EU upon Protocol 3 becoming a dead letter. Again, UK support
would be both welcome and desirable in this process, though the terms and
character of this assistance would ultimately be a matter for negotiation.
Where public international law is of assistance is in providing near certainty
that a sovereign Jersey would be able to
preserve its distinct geographic and institutional character with no material
discontinuity.
Stefano Mariani MA (Oxon), MSc (LSE), Solicitor of
the Senior Courts of England
and Wales,
is an Assistant at Carey Olsen. The views expressed in this article are the
author’s own.