Developments in Guernsey corporate
insolvency law
Abel Lyall and Iona Mitchell
This article
considers recent changes to the Companies (Guernsey) Law 2008, which represent
the most significant development of Guernsey’s insolvency law in almost
thirty years.
Introduction
1 Recent amendments to the Companies (Guernsey)
Law, 2008 (“the 2008 Law”) represent the most significant
development to corporate insolvency law in Guernsey for almost 30 years.
Introduced by the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (Insolvency) (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2020 (“the Ordinance”), which came into effect on 1
January 2023, the changes look to address what were seen as shortcomings in
Guernsey’s insolvency regime.
2 Apart from the creation of an administration
regime in 2005, little had changed to Guernsey insolvency law since the enactment
of the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 1994 (“the 1994 Law”). Indeed, the 2008 Law had updated the 1994 Law to take
account of the different approach in the 2008 Law, but had done little else. This
arguably represented a lost
opportunity. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the
increased focus on insolvency law, and perceived deficiencies led various
stakeholders in industry and the professions to attempt to deal with this
unfinished business.
Proposals for reform
3 The 2008 Law created the Companies Registrar
and removed the requirement to seek HM Procureur’s
consent to the incorporation of a company, and abandoned the complex
capital maintenance rules in favour of a more
efficient “solvency” requirement when making distributions to
members. Missing, however, were any substantial changes to the insolvency
regime applying to companies.
4 That is not to say that Guernsey’s
insolvency regime in 2008 was outdated or hopelessly deficient. It shared
similar concepts found in English insolvency law, but usually in a simplified
form. Procedures were (and continue to be) generally straightforward. It
features the use of voluntary and compulsory liquidation for the winding up of
companies, as well as the availability of administration orders to facilitate
the rescue of companies as a going concern.
5 But this simplicity comes at a cost. There are
areas where the 2008 Law is simply silent or fails to specify how a particular
issue should be dealt with. While the court may use the directions’
power, this has limitations but also adds expense that
might be avoided completely if certain rules or powers were available under the
statute. It also leads to a lack of clarity and certainty as to how any
individual issues might be resolved.
6 In its 2014 consultation paper, Guernsey’s
Commence and Employment Department (now known as the Committee for Economic
Development and referred to as “the Committee” in this article)
stated that “effective,
equitable and transparent insolvency laws are an essential ingredient in modern
economies.” The consultation paper
noted that prior to the global financial crisis, insolvency law did not feature
as a major factor in the decisions on legal domicile by investors and businesses.
In a long period of stable and consistent growth, businesses were focused on
establishment issues rather than about end of corporate life and exit
strategies. However, the focus on financial failure meant that for business and
investors these exit strategies became a more important consideration when
choosing a domicile. As the Committee said, “a clear and effective insolvency regime can bring substantial
competitive advantages to a jurisdiction.”
7 The starting point adopted by the Committee was
that Guernsey’s insolvency regime should remain “broadly consistent”
with the approach taken in the UK which was consistent with the “creditor
friendly” approach that had featured previously in both jurisdictions. Any changes were thus never
likely to be revolutionary. The Committee noted that many of the necessary
elements for an effective insolvency regime were already in existence in
Guernsey though some might “require
modernisation and amendment to maximise
effectiveness.”
8 To assist with its task, the Committee formed a
working group of lawyers and insolvency professionals to advise
on reform. The Consultation led to the identification of several key proposals.
They included:
(a)
the creation of Insolvency Rules and the establishment
of an Insolvency Rules Committee to advise on those rules;
(b)
a requirement on office holders to report any
misconduct on the part of directors or officers of the company;
(c)
the introduction of creditors’ committees for
the administration process;
(d)
an ability to exit administration into a dissolution
without the need for a separate winding up;
(e)
increased rights of creditors in a voluntary winding
up, including the requirement for independent liquidators where a company is in
insolvency along with notice and creditor meeting requirements;
(f)
the creation of a formal “proof of debt”
procedure;
(g) increased powers of liquidators and administrators to
seek the production of information about the affairs of the company, including
the use of a compulsive examination process;
(h)
the introduction of an undervalue transaction action
similar to s 238 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986; and
(i) provisions dealing with
extortionate credit transactions and onerous property.
9 Many of these proposed areas for reform have
survived the legislative process and now form the basis of the recent
amendments to the 2008 Law.
Changes
introduced by the Ordinance
Introduction
of insolvency rules
10 The Consultation identified that, unlike in
other jurisdictions such as the UK, there was no set of
procedural rules for corporate insolvency in Guernsey. This was despite
Guernsey’s regime being based on early UK legislation. The Consultation
revealed support for the introduction of a set of rules to clarify the
processes that should be adopted as well as allowing procedures to be changed
and adapted without the need for primary legislation.
11 The Ordinance provides the Committee with the
power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect those parts of the
2008 Law dealing with dissolution, winding up, liquidation or administration.
The rule making power is very broad, and expressly covers (though without
limitation) rules on the submission of proof of debt, the procedure for proving
the debt and the power of a liquidator to accept or reject a proof of debt. It
also permits the Committee to introduce any rule “corresponding to that
made in England and Wales by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016”.
It is accordingly possible for the Committee to deal with a very wide range of
issues.
12 Draft insolvency rules dealing with
operational aspects of the new provisions were finalised
and came into force on 1 January 2023, at the same time as the Ordinance and
the Amendment Ordinance. Areas covered by the rules
include the functioning of creditor meetings and contain prescribed form
documents for certain stages of an insolvency process. To allow the rules to be
amended swiftly when required and kept up to date, there is a standing rules
committee. As discussed below, it is expected that further rules will be
introduced.
Administration
Meeting of creditors
13 While in practice Guernsey administrations
were recognised as being effective, there were
several perceived gaps in the statutory provisions. For example, administrators
in Guernsey were under no obligation to call a meeting of creditors during an
administration. Indeed, there was little in the way of formal requirements on
administrators to consult with creditors on the conduct of an administration.
As the Consultation identified, such meetings enable the administrator to
explain how it is intend to carry out the administration as well as to ensure that
creditors are appraised of developments during the administration.
14 Subject to limited exceptions, administrators
are now required to call a meeting of the company’s known creditors
within a set period after appointment and provide an explanation of the aims of
and the likely process of the administration. The new insolvency rules
make provision for the functioning of these creditor meetings including the notice
period, notice content, location, quorum, chair, voting, suspension and
adjournment, minutes, and electronic communications.
Distributions to
creditors
15 An administrator has a reasonably
comprehensive range of powers set out in Schedule 1 to the 2008 Law broadly in
line with the powers afforded an administrator under the Insolvency Act 1986. However, they did not
include a power to make distributions of the companies’ assets to
creditors. Administrators now have the express power to make distributions
where they think it likely to assist the achievement of any purpose for which
the administration order was made. However, permission of
the court will be necessary unless the payment is made to a secured creditor or
a creditor with a preferred debt under the Preferred Debts (Guernsey) Law,
1983.
Exit from
administration
16 Another area for reform was how an
administration is brought to an end. An administrator must apply to be
discharged once the purpose of the administration is achieved or could no
longer be achieved. The company would normally either fall back to the control
of its directors or be placed into winding up. Very often, the assets of the
company had already been realised and there was
nothing for the liquidator to do except make distributions. In the
Consultation, the Committee expressed the view that there was merit in allowing
an insolvent company in administration to have a power to distribute its assets
and move straight to dissolution, rather than requiring a winding up order to
be made.
17 This proposal has been implemented but is only
available where it appears to the Royal Court that a company has no assets that
might permit a distribution to creditors. This procedural safeguard
is aimed at protecting the interests of creditors whilst reducing time and cost
where appropriate.
Liquidation
Independence of liquidator
18 There is generally no limitation in the 2008
Law as to who could be appointed a liquidator or administrator of a Guernsey
company. While the suitability of those appointed as administrators or
liquidators in a compulsory winding up are subject to the scrutiny of the
court, there is no similar oversight with voluntary liquidations.
19 One area of focus was the absence of any
requirement for an insolvency practitioner to be independent, thereby
permitting directors or shareholders could wind up their own companies. This
increased the potential risk of creditors being disadvantaged due to conflicts
of interest, particularly in insolvent liquidations.
20 This is dealt with in the new provisions by
the introduction of a requirement that, in an insolvent winding up, the
liquidators must be independent and—unless in the
opinion of the liquidator there are no assets available for distribution to the
creditors—must call a meeting of creditors within one month of being
appointed.
The mechanism through which this is achieved is to make a distinction between solvent
and insolvent voluntary liquidations. Directors are now given the option to
make a declaration of solvency, in the prescribed form contained in the
Insolvency Rules, which is a declaration stating that, in the opinion of the
board, the company satisfies the solvency test. If no declaration is
made, the requirements for liquidator independence and an initial meeting of
creditors apply.
A director or former director, company secretary or administrator of the
company would be ineligible to be the liquidator. There continues to be no
restriction on who may wind up a solvent company in a voluntary winding up.
21 The 2008 Law also makes provision for what
happens in the situation where, following a declaration of solvency being made,
it becomes apparent to the liquidator that the company is in fact insolvent. These include the calling
of a meeting of creditors to ratify the liquidator’s appointment or
appoint an alternative liquidator, or otherwise an application to court for the
sanction of the liquidator’s appointment.
Exemption from
audit
22 In the interests of minimising
unnecessary expenditure, companies in liquidation are now exempt from the requirement
to prepare audited accounts.
Investigative
powers
23 While liquidators have always been entitled to
receipt of the books and records of the company, as comprising property of the
company, liquidators lacked some of the express investigative powers to go
further and compel the production of information about the company’s
affairs. Such powers are often vital in assisting the office holder to find out
the financial state of the company, particularly when it is suspected that
company assets may have been inappropriately diminished prior to the winding
up. The amendments make changes in three categories: (i)
production of a statement of affairs; (ii) production of documents and
information; and (iii) examination of company officers.
(i) Statement of affairs
24 The Consultation identified that most
insolvency regimes required the directors and officers of a company to submit a
statement of affairs which set out the salient points of the company’s
finances, allowing the administrator or liquidator rapidly to assess the state
of a company. Whilst under Guernsey law administrators had the statutory power
to require such a document to be provided, liquidators did not. To deal with
this in practice, on granting an application for a winding up order, the Royal Court
would make an order requiring the directors and officers to provide a statement
of affairs to the liquidator.
25 Under the new provisions, the administrator’s
statutory power to demand a statement of affairs has been extended to a
liquidator.
Accordingly, they may require the following persons to provide a statement of
affairs:
(a) officers
or former officers of the company;
(b) those who
in the last 12 months:
ii(i) are or have been employed by the
company;
i(ii) have
taken part in the company’s formation;
(iii) are or have been officers of or employed by a company which
is or was within the last 12 months an officer of the company (for example, an
employee of a corporate director of the company in liquidation); or
(iv) with the leave of the Royal Court, any other person.
(ii) Production
of documents and information
26 The new provisions also give liquidators (but
not administrators) an express power to apply to the Royal Court for an order
compelling the persons listed above to produce documents and information
relating to the company. The liquidator is entitled to documents and
information “reasonably required” for the purposes of the
performance of their functions in respect of the winding up of the company. The “reasonably
required” test is similar, but not identical, to UK provisions under s 235
of the Insolvency Act 1986. It is therefore likely that Guernsey would adopt a
similar approach to the question of what is “reasonably required.”
The legislation does not expand upon what this means, but it is generally
accepted that the role of the liquidator is to investigate the affairs of the
company, including the cause of company’s failure, so it is anticipated
that the liquidator could obtain any information pertaining to this. In R v Brady, the English Court of
Appeal indicated that the purpose includes the identification of potential
criminal or other misconduct. It is therefore expected that the test would be
construed widely.
27 The obligation to provide the information
and/or documents extends to confidential information except where it is privileged.
28 A clear ability for liquidators to seek such
an order from the court may lead to greater co-operation and voluntary
production by parties having such information and documents.
(iii) Examination
of company officers
29 In re Med Vineyards Ltd (in liquidation), (“Med Vineyards”)
held that the Royal Court’s power under s 110 of the Companies
(Guernsey) Law, 1994 to give directions to a
liquidator in relation to any matter arising in relation to the winding up of
the company, extended to permit the court to give directions to a former
director to answer questions directed to him by the liquidator. Carey, Deputy
Bailiff, (as he then was) indicated, obiter, that it would also have
been open to the liquidator to have proceeded under s 106 of the 1994 Law
which enabled a liquidator to apply to the Royal Court for an order where it
appeared that any past or present officer of the company had appropriated or
otherwise misapplied any of the company’s assets. This covered not only
deliberate but also inadvertent misapplications.
30 Both relevant provisions were retained, with
appropriate modifications, in the modern Companies Law, but the parameters of any
such power and its practical operation were uncertain. For example, the Deputy
Bailiff had directed that in the first instance the former director should be
questioned by means of written interrogatory rather than oral examination, but
it was not clear if this was a rule of general application.
31 Further, in In re X (a bankrupt), Marshall, Lieut-Bailiff, refused
to extend Med Vineyard’s scope
to grant an application by the trustee in bankruptcy of an English bankrupt,
appointed by an English court, for an order permitting the trustee to examine
any person in Guernsey involved in the bankrupt’s affairs, including any
person connected to certain Guernsey companies in which the bankrupt had
interests. With reference to the decision in Singularis Holdings Ltd v Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, she did not accept the
submission that as a matter of general Guernsey law the court was able to “fill
in” the statute by providing ancillary powers in aid. This caused McMahon,
Deputy Bailiff, (as he then was) to doubt in Batty v Bourse Trust Co Ltd, whether Med Vineyards
would still be followed in the corporate context. He also noted that in the
meantime the 2008 Law had resulted from a comprehensive review of the Companies
Act 2006 and, to an extent, the Insolvency Act 1986 and so contained much more
detailed provision than previous company legislation. Accordingly, omissions
from Guernsey’s statutory regime may have been deliberate and should not
be “filled in” by the court.
32 The liquidator now has the power to apply to
the court to appoint an inspector to examine any person who is or has been an
officer of the company. While the examination
will be similar to that of a witness in a civil trial, it will be conducted in
private.
33 Statements can be used as evidence in other
proceedings, save criminal proceedings, where they can only be used in very
limited circumstances. UK authority is likely to be followed on the limitations
on obtaining such statements, so that they will either not be obtainable or
will be subject to use restrictions. The power should not be used merely to
provide the liquidator with an advantage in relation to separate litigation,
However, when considering the limitations on use, it is expected that the Royal
Court would also take account of the differences between the UK and Guernsey
regimes, such as the availability in the UK of both public and private
examinations, and the wider group who may be examined.
34 In Guernsey, the provisions apply to
examinations of “any person who is or has been an officer of the company.”
It is therefore a narrower class. One notable limitation is that the
legislation does not appear to make provision for the examination of directors
or employees of a corporate director. Given that it is permissible and indeed
common for Guernsey companies to have only corporate directors, this may cause
difficulties in some insolvencies.
35 The comparable power in the UK under s 236
of the Insolvency Act 1986 is more widely drafted and applyies
not only to any officer of the company but also to: (1) any person known or
suspected to have in their possession any property of the company or supposed
to be indebted to the company; or (2) any person whom the court thinks capable
of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, business, dealings,
affairs or property of the company. In Re
Highgrade Traders Ltd, Oliver LJ indicated (obiter)
that the references to “person” above could include companies. The
UK power would therefore extend, one way or another, to any natural persons “behind”
the corporate director. The Guernsey provisions do not appear to extend as far
and this could be an area for future legislative intervention.
Duty to report
delinquent officers
36 Prior to the reforms, liquidators in a
compulsory liquidation were required to report to the Royal Court at the conclusion
of the proceedings, but there was no general statutory duty on administrators
and liquidators to report to the relevant authorities if they found, or
suspected, misconduct on the part of the directors or officers of a company.
The new provisions require both types of office holders to report delinquent
officers of insolvent companies to the Registrar of Companies or, in the case
of supervised companies, to the Guernsey Financial Services Commission.
Setting aside
transactions
37 Under the previous regime, liquidators already
had the statutory power to bring actions for misfeasance in office or set aside
the making of unfair preferences to creditors. In addition, it was considered
that liquidators
could use the Paulienne action, available
under customary law, which enable a creditor to set aside an agreement between
its debtor and a third-party recipient, which was made to defeat the interests
of that debtor’s creditors. However, it was limited in scope, in
particular because of the requirements that: (1) the debtor be insolvent at the
time of the transfer or rendered insolvent by the transfer; and (2) where there
was consideration, the recipient also intended to defeat creditors.
38 The Paulienne
action remains available but in addition there are now statutory powers to set
aside undervalue transactions and those involving credit on extortionate terms.
Transactions at
undervalue
39 Liquidators and administrators may now apply
to the Royal Court to set aside a transaction if:
(a)
it occurred within the last six months before the
liquidation/administration, or two years where the other party to the
transaction is connected to the company;
(b)
the company was insolvent at the date of the
transaction or as a result of it; and
(c)
it was not entered into in good faith for the purpose
of carrying on the business of the company where there were reasonable grounds
for believing that it would be of benefit to the company.
40 These new provisions align Guernsey broadly
with the UK position under s 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986, but with some
differences. First, the definition of a connected person in s 424(7) of
the 2008 Law is less prescriptive than the definition in s 249 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. Secondly, the provisions aimed at helping the court to
determine whether a person was acting in good faith when entering into a
transaction at undervalue are framed differently.
Extortionate
credit transactions
41 In addition, liquidators or administrators now
can apply to the court to set aside extortionate credit transactions entered
into in the last three years before the administration/liquidation.
42 A transaction would be regarded as
extortionate if, having regard to the risk accepted by the person providing the
credit, the terms required exorbitant payments or the transaction otherwise
grossly contravened ordinary principles of fair dealing. This is the same as
the test used in s 244(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986. Whether a
transaction will meet this test will of course be fact-specific.
43 Where a liquidator or administration brings an
application to set aside this type of transaction, there is a presumption that
the transaction was extortionate.
Disclaiming
onerous property
44 Many jurisdictions permit a liquidator to
disclaim assets where those assets are onerous to locate and administer, or
effectively valueless. The new provisions introduce the power for the
liquidator to disclaim onerous property. The definition of “onerous
property” includes real property situated outside of the Bailiwick if it
is unsaleable, not readily saleable or is such that it may give rise to a
liability to pay money or perform any onerous act.
45 The Insolvency Rules provide more detail
around the requirements for the notice and confirm that any rights relating to
netting, set-off, or compensation or enforcement thereof are unaffected.
Winding up foreign companies
46 A number of foreign companies carry on
business in Guernsey and/or have assets under control in the jurisdiction.
Before the recent changes, there was no mechanism for these companies to be
wound up in Guernsey and instead they would need to be wound up in their home
jurisdiction before an application could be made to recognise
the proceedings in Guernsey. This was identified in the Consultation and, given
that it could have implications beyond insolvency, the topic formed the subject
of a supplemental consultation dated 16 August 2016.
47 The new provisions provide that a
non-Guernsey company may be wound up by the Royal Court where:
(a)
the company is dissolved or has ceased to carry on
business or is carrying on business only for the purpose of winding up its
affairs;
(b)
the company is unable to pay its debts within the
meaning of the existing statutory test (i.e.
it fails to comply with a statutory demand within 21 days or if it fails the
solvency test); or
(c)
the court is of the opinion that it is just and
equitable that the company should be wound up.
48 These are narrower than the circumstances in
which a Guernsey company may be wound up by the court. Although the precise
parameters of the jurisdiction are yet to be tested, it is likely that Guernsey
will follow the approach adopted by the courts in England & Wales that
there must be a “sufficient connection” with Guernsey for the Royal
Court to exercise its discretion to wind up the foreign company. This will mean
that foreign companies having a place of business, a branch office or assets in
the jurisdiction may be susceptible to winding up by the Guernsey Court. In addition, it is likely
that those seeking to wind up the foreign company will need to show that they
will benefit from the winding up.
49 The changes give foreign office-holders the
ability to seek winding up orders in Guernsey and obtain an appointment in this
jurisdiction, ancillary to the winding up being conducted in the company’s
own jurisdiction. There is also the potential for creditors and shareholders to
apply for a winding up of a foreign company in Guernsey unconnected with any
foreign proceedings. This may be attractive way to shortcut the need to seek a
winding up in the foreign jurisdiction and then recognition in Guernsey, where
the business, the company’s directors and managers or its assets are
located in Guernsey.
50 Both circumstances allow the liquidator to use
the full powers available under the 2008 Law, including those to investigate
the affairs of the company, rather than the more limited powers available by
way of foreign recognition. It can also lead to far great efficiencies where
large aspects of the company’s business are administered in Guernsey.
Commencement
and transitional provisions
51 Under Regulation 2 of the Companies (Guernsey)
Law, 2008 (Insolvency) (Amendment) Ordinance,
2020 (Commencement and Application) Regulations, 2022 and r 2 of
the Insolvency Rules, the new regime only applies to insolvency proceedings
where the appointment of a liquidator or administrator was made on or after the
commencement date of 1 January 2023. This means that, although the new
provisions are in force, they will not be available to office holders in
insolvency proceedings that were already ongoing as at the commencement date.
Given the doubts expressed by the court over the common law information
gathering powers of liquidators, this does present a challenge for
liquidators in existing insolvencies who would no doubt have welcomed clarity
on the scope of their powers. One aspect that does conflict with the “prospective
only” approach in the commencement Ordinance is that it appears to permit
challenges to undervalue or extortionate credit transactions that were
undertaken prior to 1 January 2023, provided the liquidation commenced after
that date.
Future
developments
52 The Consultation identified a number of areas
that could be covered by insolvency rules, which have not been included in the
rules that came into force on 1 January 2023.
53 One aspect likely to be developed further is
the proof of debt process. At present there is no proof of debt procedure for
the liquidator to establish claims against an insolvent company. At times liquidators
have used the directions power to establish such proof of debt procedures, though
this obviously involves additional costs and time. The Consultation sought
feedback on the introduction of a proof of debts procedure for Guernsey and the
form this would take and respondents were unanimously in favour
of a legislative framework to submit a proof of debt and to prove that claim.
The Ordinance expressly provides this as one area where the Committee may make
rules and it is expected that further insolvency rules dealing with this will
be issued in due course.
Conclusion
54 The developments represent important and
helpful improvements to Guernsey’s corporate insolvency regime, although they
are far from revolutionary. They improve on the existing regime, adding clarity
and functionality, while avoiding some of the unnecessary complexity that
arises from the detailed statutory regimes found elsewhere. The ability to pick
and choose from the England and Wales insolvency rules, without their wholesale
introduction, will be particularly beneficial.
Abel Lyall is an Advocate of the Guernsey Royal Court and is a partner
and local practice leader of the Guernsey litigation team at Mourant Ozannes (Guernsey) LLP. He
was a member of the working group of insolvency professionals advising on the
proposed insolvency law reform in 2013.
Iona Mitchell is
an Advocate of the Guernsey Royal Court and is a knowledge lawyer in the
Guernsey litigation team at Mourant Ozannes (Guernsey) LLP.